An Institutional Approach to Bordering in Islands: The Canary Islands on the African-European Migration Routes by Dirk Godenau
                                                                   Island Studies Journal, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2012, pp. 3-18 
An Institutional Approach to Bordering in Islands: The Canary Islands on the African-
European Migration Routes 
 
Dirk Godenau 
Departamento de Economía Aplicada 
Universidad de La Laguna 
Canary Islands, Spain 
dgodenau@ull.es 
 
Abstract:  Islands  play  a  significant  role  in  international  irregular  maritime  migration. 
Frequently  they  are  part  of  maritime  interstitial  spaces  between  states,  and  their  location, 
combined with institutional membership, makes them part of international migration routes and 
subject  to  border  management  strategies.  In  this  paper  borders  are  analysed  as  social 
institutions used for regulating relative permeability through rules of entry and exit for persons, 
goods  and  capital.  Borders  institutionalize  territoriality  and  are  politically  implemented  by 
states. They are selective, also in migration, and irregular border transit is not always indicative 
of an inability to control. The Canary Islands are used as an illustrative example of how border 
management at the southern edge of the European Union has evolved towards more coercive 
deterrence  and  tighter  surveillance.  The  Canary  Islands  experienced  irregular  maritime 
immigration from the west African coasts during the first decade of the 21
st century and most 
of these migrants intended to use the islands as transit space towards the European continent. 
Increasing surveillance in countries of origin, enforcement of border controls and stricter return 
policies were used to stop flows. The so-called “cayuco crisis” in 2006 induced institutional 
change  in  border  management  and  forced  the  active  involvement  of  the  EU  through 
FRONTEX. 
 
Keywords: border; Canary Islands; European Union; FRONTEX islands; irregular migration; 
social institutions 
 
© 2012 Institute of Island Studies, University of Prince Edward Island, Canada 
 
 
Migration in Island Contexts 
 
Migration links places in demographic, economic and cultural terms. Migration is a sign of 
openness and frequently a result of up- and downturns in local labour markets. Therefore, 
while insularity is related to small size and difficult access or remoteness, migration indicates 
that islands often are not “marginal islands” (King, 2009: 63) and instead of “islands of the 
world” they form a “world of islands” (Hau’ofa, 1993), characterised by interconnectedness 
and  openness.  In  this  nodal  character  of  islands,  migration  is  just  another  symptom  of 
embeddedness into a wider context, together with other flows like capital, goods, services and 
sociocultural bonds. 
 
If islandness is interpreted as an intervening variable (Baldacchino, 2004: 278), islands are a 
specific research object of heuristic value (King, 2009: 55-56), but their analytical relevance in 
social  science  does  not  imply  that  we  need  new  and different  theories  and  instruments  to D. Godenau 
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understand social realities in islands. In this sense, islands can be useful also in migration 
studies, but without the need for claiming a new and different mobility theory for islands. 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyse recent irregular maritime immigration in the Canary Islands 
as part of the international migration routes from Africa to Europe. These islands belong to the 
southern  border  of  the  European  Union  and  are  subject  to  Spanish  and  European  border 
management strategies. The border will be interpreted as a social institution and not simply as 
geographical line or area. By doing so, the implications of islandness for border management 
in maritime areas will be moved towards the institutional and political determination of relative 
permeability. While purely location-related benefits and costs of irregular migration through 
islands  have  not  changed  considerably  over  time,  induced  institutional  change  in  border 
management strategies clearly influences the relative permeability and appeal of the Canary 
Islands as a transit area. It will be argued that their geographical status as border islands is not 
sufficient to explain their role in migration routes. The reactive strategies of non-state actors to 
maintain border porosity are not included in the analysis. 
 
As physical and terrestrial entities surrounded by water, islands evoke perceptions of location 
and identity. Their shores mark visible physical limits, and the separation from other terrestrial 
units is easily perceived as a natural barrier which obliges the use of additional resources if it is 
to be crossed. In terms of human mobility, physical islandness implies that boats or planes are 
needed to travel to or from an island. With regards to migration, and particularly irregular 
migration,  islandness  implies  a  higher  effort  dedicated  to  the  collective  organization  of 
movement  when  compared  to  mobility  in  a  terrestrial  context.  As  maritime  transport  is 
organized collectively, and air transport even more so, detection probability at island entry 
points is usually high.  
 
Borders are a type of barrier (Batten & Nijkamp, 1990). They are socially constructed, have a 
spatial dimension and often use physical features – mountains, deserts, rivers, oceans – as a 
means for reducing enforcement costs. Islands tend to have borders of their own (island states) 
or to be part of external borders (border  regions). The coincidence of  natural barriers  and 
socio-political  borders  leads  to  the  question  about  the  consequences  of  institutional 
membership for migration patterns in island spaces. Residential relocation with border crossing 
constitutes an international migration, with all the usual applicable controls and restrictions. In 
the case of small island states, this obliges border control efforts to be organized and financed 
with local resources; in the case of island regions, it implies being part of a national border and 
its homogeneous/heterogeneous implementation
1. The combination of geographical location 
and  institutional  membership  determines  the  positionality  of  islands  (King,  2009:  75).  For 
example, many southern European islands are considered to be part of the “soft underbelly” of 
the EU, which combines immigration pressure from the African continent with relatively lax 
external and internal control policies, leading to high proportions of irregular immigration, at 
least during periods of economic growth
2. 
                                                           
1 Although national borders may be formally homogeneous for all regions, there may be differences in practice 
due to “hot spots” (e.g. drug trafficking), physical differences (land borders, maritime borders), path dependency 
(border history), etc. 
2 Metaphors  are  not  neutral.  A  “soft  underbelly”  seems  to  indicate  a  vulnerable  part  of  a  larger  body,  with 
irregular immigration being the knife cutting it open, with risks to essential organs.                                                             Institutional Approach to Bordering: The Canary Islands 
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The  importance  of  islands  in  international  irregular  migration  routes  is  related  to  their 
geostrategic position as part of the external border of continental states or supranational entities. 
Why do those who organize human trafficking include islands as points of entry? According to 
Carling  (2007:  324),  controlling  a  maritime  border  is  fundamentally  different  and  more 
difficult than a land border because it requires surveillance of an area (the sea) rather than just 
a line. This is debatable. First, because the argument that maritime borders are areas and land 
borders are lines is conceptually wrong, as one can draw control lines on both shores and even 
at sea. Migrants always have to pass a line and terrestrial contexts are also areas. Maritime 
areas are plain and relatively easy to screen if compared to a mountainous jungle. Second, 
travelling  on  the  high  sea  obliges  journeys  in  groups:  one  cannot  walk  alone.  Groups  of 
migrants (vessels) are easier to detect than isolated individuals. Third, control costs vary due to 
many reasons, not only the length or extension of the border itself. For example, remote control 
in  countries  of  origin  can  be  relatively  cheap.  Detection  probabilities  depend  on  available 
technology (radars, satellites and others) and these technologies may have other parallel uses 
(e.g. detection of drug trafficking)
3. Fourth, maritime borders can be too dangerous during part 
of the year and this natural impermeability lowers control efforts and costs. We may also add 
to  these  general  aspects  of  maritime  borders  that  the  smallness  of  islands  increases  the 
probability of detection after arrival (rat-hole effect), while continents offer more diversified 
possibilities of getting  away from the border.  Islands are only  attractive as transit areas if 
transport to the continent is guaranteed and financed after interception. 
 
Another  hypothesis  about  irregular  migration  in  islands  is  related  to  their  possible  use  for 
blocking migrants in their transit to continents. This type of selective impermeability for transit 
migrants can be accomplished formally, as occurs in the case of Australia when “the Australian 
legislature amended the Migration Act in order to limit the country’s obligations with respect 
to migrants: it did so by designating portions of its sovereign territory as ‘non‐Australia’ for the 
strict purposes of claiming asylum. These portions include Christmas Island, Ashmore Reef, 
Cartier  Islands,  and  the  Cocos  (Keeling)  Islands”  (Baldacchino,  2010:  130).  Another 
possibility is to keep migrant transfers to the mainland low, thereby building up pressure in 
reception  areas.  This  confinement  strategy  would  use  the  islands’  geographic  position  to 
prevent irregular migrants from reaching the mainland. 
 
Borders as Social Institutions 
 
We will use the term “border” and not “frontier” as the line of demarcation. As Anderson 
(1997: 9) points out: “three words are in common use – frontier, boundary and border – and a 
fourth, now archaic, term – march – which are applied to these outer limits. Frontier is the 
word with the widest meaning, although its original meaning was military – the zone in which 
one faced the enemy. In contemporary usage, it can mean the precise line at which jurisdictions 
meet, usually demarcated and controlled by customs, police and military personnel. […] The 
                                                           
3 The  European  Commission  (2011:  9)  indicates  that  “synergies  have  been  identified  between  two  major 
initiatives on operational cooperation at the maritime external borders – the control of persons under the umbrella 
of FRONTEX and combating narcotics trafficking in the framework of the Maritime Analysis and Operation 
Centre-Narcotics  (MAOC-N)  and  the  Centre  de  Coordination  pour  la  Lutte  Anti-Drogue  en  Mediterranée 
(CeCLAD-M)”. D. Godenau 
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term  border  can  be  applied  to  a  zone,  usually  a  narrow  one,  or  it  can  be  the  line  of 
demarcation.” 
 
If we do not accept the explanation of the function of islands in migration routes as a result of 
the  nature  of  maritime  borders  (areas  that  are  more  difficult  to  control),  what  can  be  the 
alternative? We propose an institutional analysis of borders (Godenau, 2009)
4. The argument is 
as  follows:  borders  are  social  institutions;  their  permeability  is  socially  constructed  and 
politically managed by states; establishing a border is an act of power; borders institutionalize 
territoriality; border permeability is multidimensional and multilateral;  borders do not only 
restrict mobility, they also promote it; borders are selective, also in migration; permeability is 
constructed not only by the state, other actors also matter; irregular border transit is not always 
unwanted  or  indicative  of  an  inability  to  control;  borders  adapt  to  new  situations  through 
institutional learning. 
 
Social  institutions  are  compounds  of  rules  established  by  societies  or  organizations  which 
channel and promote the creation of relatively stable expectations which actors may maintain 
in their interactions with others (North, 1990; 2005). Markets, private property, and the family 
are examples of behaviour-guiding social institutions. Borders may be added to the list, as they 
are socially constructed and enforced rules:  
 
The frontier is the basic political institution: no rule-bound economic, social or political 
life in complex societies could be organized without them (Anderson, 1997: 1).  
 
Their function is to condition the trans-border mobility of incoming and outgoing flows. The 
emergence of borders is linked to power. Establishing a border is always an act of power (Paasi, 
2001: 23), and asymmetry in power between territorial units tends to provoke asymmetry in 
bilateral  border  conditioning
5.  These  differences  are  clearly  visible  in  how  borders  treat 
international migration (e.g. Fortress Europe). Borders, states and societies reinforce each other 
mutually, because borders are a constitutional element of territorial entities. In this sense, states 
and  societies  are  contained  within  their  territorial  borders.  As  an  identity-forging  device, 
border permeability tends to be a politically sensitive issue: migration is once again an example 
of how the purity of the centre is presented as threatened by immigrated otherness (Anderson 
& O’Dowd, 1999: 596). 
 
                                                           
4 In  terms  of  migration  theory,  when  focusing  on  borders  as  determinants  of  migration  flows,  we  stress  the 
importance  of  what  Lee  (1966)  called  “intermediate  obstacles”  between  origin  and  destination;  although 
“intermediate variables” would probably be a more adequate expression, because borders not only restrict flows, 
they also selectively promote them. The interpretation of borders as social institutions is in line with Hollifields 
(2000) claim for migration theory to “bring the state back in”, because borders are clearly conditioned by states 
and  international  policy.  The  institutionalist  analysis  of  borders  is  compatible  with  social  networks  and 
transnationalism approaches to migration, although it places more emphasis on structure and less on agency. By 
focusing on borders, we obviously do not imply other determinants of migration are not important (such as push 
and pull factors in origin and destination countries).  
5 “Frontiers are clearly used to maintain global inequalities. Stronger powers may respect the location of frontiers 
but may not respect the sovereignties which the frontiers are supposed to delimit. In circumstances where there are 
gross inequalities of wealth and military capability, attempts to reassert sovereign authority by weaker powers 
may seem unwarranted and even an act of aggression by the stronger powers” (Anderson, 1997: 191).                                                             Institutional Approach to Bordering: The Canary Islands 
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Borders are multidimensional and multilateral. They regulate flows of goods through trade 
agreements,  tariffs,  quotas  and  product  specifications;  capital  flows  through  restriction  or 
promotion of foreign investment; and they determine who is allowed to cross the border freely 
or under what kind of conditions (tourists, residence or work permits, etc.). These dimensions 
are not independent from each other, as capital flows may induce migration, trade negotiations 
may influence possibilities of migrant readmission agreements, etc. Borders are not one-faced 
walls  designed  only  to  restrict  entrance,  because  they  are  a  part  and  manifestation  of  the 
general  political,  social  and  cultural  relationships  between  states.  In  this  sense,  they  are 
multilateral devices and have to be looked at from at least two sides. In terms of migration 
policy analysis, flows are not only the result of immigration policies; they are also affected by 
conditions imposed on out- and transit migration. Borders are designed to be selective (Massey 
et al., 1998: 13-14). They restrict and promote flows as a result of classification and resource 
assignments (López-Sala & Esteban-Sánchez, 2010: 86) and through controlling accessibility 
into and out of certain areas (Anderson & O’Dowd, 1999: 598). 
 
Borders have their history (path dependency) and are inserted in a political, economic and 
social  setting  (embeddedness).  In  temporal  terms,  past  migration  flows  and  networks  may 
explain,  in  part,  present  selective  migration  policies,  as  is  the  case  in  Spain  with  Latin 
American countries (double nationality, etc.). Another example is decolonization; the Canary 
Islands  are  close  to  the  former  Spanish  territories  in  south  Morocco/western  Sahara  and 
decolonization  provoked  outmigration  towards  the  Canaries  in  the  1970s.  These  links  still 
influence  current  migration  patterns  and  perceptions.  The  embeddedness  into  a  specific 
geopolitical context, like being part of the Southern EU border, also has implications for border 
control efforts. Joint border patrolling through FRONTEX is an example. 
 
Although nation states are the main actors in conditioning border permeability, other actors 
also matter. Just as there is migrant transnationalism from below (Smith & Guarnizo, 1998), 
and a debate about whether it is significant or not (Waldinger & Fitzgerald, 2004), non-state 
actors also play an active role in creating and maintaining border permeability. As happens 
with  black  markets,  a  sharp  contrast  between  restrictive  regulations  on  the  one  hand,  and 
existing  demand  on  both  sides  of  the  border  on  the  other,  makes  maintaining  irregular 
permeability tempting and lucrative. Migrant networks, NGOs, smugglers, and firms act in the 
context of these opportunity structures created by border regulations. The intricate interplay of 
various types of actors on both sides of the border should not be reduced to an explanation of 
irregular migration as exclusively run by organized cartels (mafias). 
 
Irregular migration is frequently presented as a sign of political and organizational incapacity, 
as ineffective and inefficient border control. It seems that the optimum amount of irregular 
migration should be zero. But the significant difference between formal impermeability and 
informal de facto permeability may have other determinants. Perhaps the economic optimum of 
irregular migration is above zero for the  receiving society  and maintaining a  gap between 
formal and informal permeability can be used to lower labour costs through irregular migration. 
If this is the case, we can expect more efficient border controls during economic crises and 
relative inefficiency during economic booms: “… important interests inside the country may 
have a use for illegal immigrants and find them valuable” (Anderson, 1997: 150). 
 D. Godenau 
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As social institutions, borders “learn”, because they (are) adapt(ed) to new circumstances and 
can develop new organizational structures and control measures. Technology tends to play a 
central part in institutional change. Episodes of intensive irregular migration are supposed to 
accelerate  these  adaptations:  in  the  Canary  Islands,  these  changes  can  be  observed  and 
contextualized as part of the evolving Integrated Border Management (IBM) strategy of the 
EU
6. This strategy involves “a process of externalisation or ‘extra-territorialization’ of the EU 
border as a consequence of an IBM concept expanding the control beyond the EU towards the 
maritime  territories  of  African  countries”  (Carrera,  2007:  2).  Although  Article  2  of  the 
Schengen  Borders  Code  defines  external  borders  as  “the  Member  States’  land  borders, 
including river and lake borders, sea borders and their airports, river ports, sea ports and lake 
ports,  provided  that  they  are  not  internal  borders”,  strengthening  thereby  the  principle  of 
territoriality and its securitization (Carrera, 2007: 5), the IBM strategy includes surveillance of 
space  outside  the  EU  and  the  implementation  of  agreements  with  the  countries  of  origin 
(Council of Europe, 2011: 2; European Commission, 2008b: 14). 
 
The  European  IBM  strategy  is  markedly  influenced  by  the  use  of  modern  technology  and 
highlights the importance of preventive sea border surveillance. EU border control practices 
move  towards  higher  degrees  of  proactivity  and  instantaneity  (Jeandesboz,  2011:  122-124) 
through  the  European  border  surveillance  system  (EUROSUR),  upgrading  and  integrating 
control technologies in a common framework to be applied in the southern and eastern external 
borders of the EU. The EUROSUR initiative “focuses on enhancing border surveillance, with 
the  main  purpose  of  preventing  unauthorised  border  crossings,  to  counter  cross-border 
criminality and to support measures to be taken against persons who have crossed the border 
illegally” (European Commission, 2008a: 2), with control of irregular migration at the heart of 
its objectives. Apart from security motives, the initiative is justified by reference to saving 
lives through preventive control of sea areas:  
 
The recent practice of travelling on board of unseaworthy and overcrowded boats, has 
multiplied  the  number  of  unfortunate  migrants  who  continue  to  lose  their  lives  by 
drowning  in  the  Atlantic  Ocean  between  Africa  and  the  Canary  Islands  and  in  the 
Mediterranean Sea (European Commission, 2008a: 4)
7.  
 
Preventive maritime surveillance is defined by the technological possibilities of detection and 
distinguishes between coastal waters
8 and the open sea
9. The European Union financed a series 
of research and development projects to improve surveillance technology
10. 
                                                           
6 “The  notion  of  ‘integrated  border  management’  was  initially  coined  in  a  communication  drafted  by  the 
Commission’s DG Justice and Home Affairs in May 2002” (Jeandesboz, 2011: 116). 
7 As Jeandesboz (2011: 123) points out, this justification is questionable: “the practices of surveillance that are 
called upon to save lives are simultaneously putting the persons in question at risk. […] it is the initial deployment 
of the Spanish maritime surveillance system SIVE in the strait of Gibraltar that led the persons who were using 
this  itinerary  to  seek  longer  and  more  perilous  routes  –  for  instance  through  the  Canary  Islands,  which 
subsequently triggered the launching of the first major Frontex operation and the extension of SIVE to this area”. 
8 Defined  as  “maritime  areas  of  mainland  and  islands  which  can  have  adequate  surveillance  by  land  based 
infrastructure” (European Commission, 2008b: 79). 
9 Defined as “the sea out of range of adequate coverage by land based sensors” (European Commission, 2008b: 
81). 
10 Among  these  (European  Commission,  2011:  7-8):  AMASS  (Autonomous  Maritime  Surveillance  System), 
OPERMAR (Interoperable Approach to EU Maritime Security Management), WIMASS (Wide Maritime Area                                                             Institutional Approach to Bordering: The Canary Islands 
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The  proactive  character  is  reflected  by  the  objective  of  obtaining  a  Common  Pre-frontier 
Intelligence  Picture  (CPIP),  which  “should  provide  the  national  coordination  centres  in  a 
frequent, reliable and cost-efficient manner with effective, accurate and timely intelligence on 
the prefrontier area, which is of relevance for the prevention of illegal immigration and related 
cross-border crime” (European Commission, 2009: 8). This broad and integrated surveillance 
approach is moving control beyond the border-line and before the border crossings as such 
(Jeandesboz,  2011:  120).  “The  process  of  prevention  which  underlines  this  kind  of  border 
presupposes a practice of labelling an individual as an ‘irregular immigrant’ even before s/he 
leaves the country and enters EU territory” (Carrera, 2007: 25). 
 
The  EUROSUR  initiative  is  heading  towards  the  creation  of  a  common  monitoring  and 
information  sharing  environment  for  the  EU  maritime  domain  (Mediterranean  Sea,  the 
southern Atlantic Ocean [Canary Islands] and the Black Sea). “The objective of this phase is to 
integrate all existing sectoral systems which are reporting and monitoring traffic and activities 
in  sea  areas  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Member  States  and  in  adjacent  high  seas  into  a 
broader network” (European Commission, 2008a: 9). The EUROSUR framework should be 
consolidated by 2013 (European Commission, 2011: 2). 
 
Bordering in the Canary Islands 
 
The  Canary  Islands  are  one  of  the  Spanish  Autonomous  Communities  and  an  “Outermost 
Region” of the European Union
11. Both in the national and in the supranational European 
institutional setting, the Canaries are integrated with several basically economic particularities. 
Most of the Outermost Regions in the European Union, located far away from their continental 
counterparts but institutionally embedded in them, are islands. Their borders acquire specific 
strategic value if living conditions inside are very different from those in neighbouring regions.  
 
A  European  citizen  can  migrate  to  these  regions  under  conditions  of  free  mobility,  while 
citizens from their neighbouring states normally cannot. Once nationals from Third Countries 
gain residency status and citizenship in these border regions, the EU institutional framework, 
including free movement, applies and outmigration to the European continent is relatively easy. 
In this sense, outermost regions can be interpreted as points of entry and may be attractive for 
transit migration. 
 
The  institutional  setting  clearly  influences  the  position  of  the  Canary  Islands  in  terms  of 
international  migration.  Someone  migrating  to  the  Canaries  is  entering  Europe  and  Spain, 
crossing  a  border  that  is  defined  by  Spanish  immigration  policies  and  coordinated  with  a 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Airborne Surveillance), OPARUS (Open Architecture for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle-based Surveillance System), 
SEABILLA (Sea Border Surveillance), I2C (Integrated System for Interoperable Sensors and Information Sources 
for Common Abnormal Vessel Behaviour Detection and Collaborative Identification of Threat), and PERSEUS 
(Protection of European Seas and Borders through the Intelligent Use of Surveillance). 
11 “Article 299(2) of the EC Treaty and the two Communications adopted by the Commission in 2004 stress the 
need to recognize the special nature of the outermost regions and to put in place a genuine European strategy to 
support them. The Outermost Regions (the Azores, Madeira, the Canary Islands and the four French overseas 
departments) face specific problems listed in the Treaty: remoteness, insularity, small size, difficult topography 
and climate, and economic dependence on a few products” (European Commission, 2007: 3). D. Godenau 
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supranational  European  framework.  Situated  near  the  West-African  coast  and  belonging 
geographically to the African continent, the Canary Islands are a south-European border region 
and part of “Fortress Europe”. 
 
Although news in the mass media about immigration in the Canaries has been dominated by 
boat  people  arriving  from  west  African  countries,  the  composition  of  flows  and  stocks  of 
migrant  population  shows  a  completely  different  picture.  More  than  half  of  the  foreign 
population  is  of  European  origin  and  their  share  increased  during  the  last  10  years.  Their 
growth rate is second only to that of foreigners from American countries, who reached a share 
of 29% in 2009. The African and Asian populations have also grown, but at a slower pace and 
with decreasing shares; in 2009 only 10% of the total foreign population was African and 5% 
Asian (see Table 1). Therefore it is incorrect to assume that the Canary Islands would have a 
large population of African origin; 30,000 in a total population of more than 2 million is less 
than 1.5%. 
Table 1: Foreign resident population in the Canary Islands by nationality, 1998 and 2009. 
 
Nationality  1998  2009 
Annual 
growth 
rate 
% of total 
foreign 
population 
in 1998 
% of total 
foreign 
population 
in 2009 
European  30,454  169,003  41.4%  55.2  56.1 
African  6,770  30,664  32.1%  12.3  10.2 
American  10,984  86,502  62.5%  19.9  28.7 
Asian  6,586  14,910  11.5%  11.9  5.0 
Total  55,218  301,204  40.5%  100.0  100.0 
 
Source: INE. Population Register (Padrón Municipal). Calculations by author. 
 
Another  of  the  public  opinion  myths  (Haas,  2007)  one  may  encounter  involves  irregular 
immigrants and their supposedly predominant African origin. Once again, it is probably the 
impact of news in the mass media that created this idea. A survey of irregular immigrants in 
Tenerife conducted in 2005 (Godenau & Zapata, 2007) showed that nearly all migrants in 
irregular  administrative  situations  (without  a  residence  permit)  had  entered  by  plane  with 
tourist  visas  and  overstayed  afterwards.  It  is  true  that,  among  African  immigrants,  illegal 
maritime  border  crossing  has  been  more  frequent;  but  their  absolute  number  in  terms  of 
resident  population  is  low,  because  of  repatriation  to  countries  of  origin  or  transfers  to 
mainland Spain after staying in retention centres. This can be illustrated by the fact that only 
15% of the 23,211 irregular immigrants who applied for regularization during the extraordinary 
amnesty in 2005 were of African origin. 
The more restrictive and enforced the border, the higher the cost for maintaining irregular 
permeability. In this context, crossing the border physically without permission is only one of 
many options. If borders become more impermeable due to tighter controls, fake documents 
may  become  more  attractive.  And,  if  borders  become  more  difficult  to  cross  in  certain 
countries  or  regions,  other  parts  of  the  border  may  achieve  feasibility  in  the  cost-benefit                                                             Institutional Approach to Bordering: The Canary Islands 
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analysis of intermediaries. This happened in the Canary Islands during the last decade when the 
Mediterranean crossing to Spain became more impermeable due to increasing control efforts. 
The migration route shifted from a short maritime passage to a longer one, with higher risks 
and  costs  for  migrants,  because  the  SIVE  (Integral  System  for  External  Surveillance)  had 
already  been  implemented  in  the  Mediterranean  but  not  in  the  Canary  Islands  (European 
Commission, 2008b: 13).  
 
The irregular maritime border crossings between west African countries and the Canary Islands 
started during the nineties and little attention was paid at the beginning to the arrivals of small 
wooden boats from Morocco (the so-called “pateras”). After this initial period of sporadic 
arrivals, the 21
st century brought the intensification of flows and a southward shift from the 
Moroccan  departure  points  to  others  like  Nouadhibou,  Saint  Louis,  Dakar,  Conakry  and 
Freetown. For these longer journeys a different type of boat was used, the “cayuco”, with a 
larger number of passengers (some of them with more than 200 occupants) of sub-Saharan 
origin. From 1994 to 2010, 96,239 people entered or tried to gain access to the Canaries via 
illegal entry points, using to this end 2,899 vessels (accumulated annual data of the Spanish 
Ministry of Home Affairs). 
Table 2: Illegal border crossings detected at land and sea borders. 
 
Route  2006  2007  2008  2009  % change 
2008/2009  2010  % change 
2009/2010 
 Greece Sea (all areas)     n.a.    n.a.   31,729  28,841  -9%  6,175  -79% 
 Greece Land with Turkey     n.a.    n.a.   1,448  8,782  -39%  47,706  443% 
 Greece Land with Albania     n.a.    n.a.   38,573  37,898  -2%  33,704  -11% 
 Italy Sea (all areas)     n.a.   2,158  36,947  957  -74%  44  -54% 
 Spain Sea Canary Islands    31,678  12,478  9,181  2,244  -76%  196  -91% 
 Spain Land Ceuta and Melilla   7,502  408  65  1,639  -75%  1,567  -4% 
 Malta Sea     n.a.   913  2,798  1,473  -47%  48  -97% 
 Others   n.a.   n.a.   18,884  14,152  -25%  10,253  -28% 
 Total     n.a.  160,132  159,092  104,599  -34%  104,049   –1% 
 
Source: Frontex Press Pack, May, 2011: 9. 
 
The maximum intensity was reached in 2006 (the “cayuco crisis”), with more than 30,000 boat 
people arriving at the shores and ports of the Canary Islands (see Figure 1). After 2006, the 
numbers dropped rapidly as the surveillance system became increasingly efficient (including 
joint patrols in origin countries), bilateral agreements for readmission were signed with west 
African  countries,  and  boat  captains  were  systematically  arrested  and  jailed,  creating  a 
deterrence  effect.  These  measures  stepped  up  border  enforcement  and  improved  the 
impermeability of this Atlantic part of the Spanish border. During 2010 and 2011, most of the 
irregular maritime arrivals took place on the Mediterranean shores and the Canary Islands lost, 
temporarily at least, their importance as  a node in African-European migration routes (see 
Table 2). While in 2006 more than 81% of all irregular maritime intercepted arrivals in Spain 
took place in the Canary Islands, in 2010 this proportion was only 11%. D. Godenau 
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Figure 1: Immigrants arriving in the Canaries through illegal entry points, 1994-2010. 
 
 
 
Source: Government Office in the Canary Islands (various years). 
 
As  López-Sala  &  Esteban-Sánchez  (2010:  86)  point  out,  the  intensification  of  irregular 
maritime migration to the Canary Islands marked a new era in Spanish immigration policy in 
general,  and  particularly  in  border  management.  The  new  policies  reinforce  border 
impermeability through tighter deterrence measures, before migrants reach the border (joint 
control  in  origin  and  transit  countries),  at  the  border  (intensification  of  control)  and  after 
having crossed the border (repatriation, return, expulsion). These changes were implemented 
gradually, starting in the late 1990s with the implementation of the integrated external border 
surveillance system (SIVE) on the Mediterranean border, which was extended afterwards to the 
Southern Atlantic border (Canary Islands). This permeability gap between different parts of the 
Spanish border is one of the mayor determinants in the temporary shift of migration routes 
from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. 
 
Reinforced border surveillance, in particular, and deterrence, in general, were complemented 
with  bilateral  cooperation  agreements  with  Morocco,  Algeria,  Guinea  Bissau,  Mauritania, 
Gambia, Guinea Conakry, Cape Verde, Mali, Niger and Senegal. Enhanced cooperation with 
these  states  included  readmission  agreements,  boosting  direct  police  cooperation  in  border 
patrolling  in  origin  and  transit  states,  and  reinforcing  Spanish  intelligence  in  west  African 
countries.  The  most  critical  program  is  the  SEAHORSE  Network,  financed  by  Spain  and 
managed by the Civil Guard, with the participation of Spain, Portugal, Cape Verde, Mauritania, 
Morocco, Senegal, Gambia and Guinea Bissau
12. 
                                                           
12 The European Commission  (2011: 7) recognizes the value of the SEAHORSE  network experience for the 
EUROSUR initiative: “SEAHORSE could be used as a model for setting up a similar network between Member 
States and neighbouring third countries in the Mediterranean Sea”.                                                             Institutional Approach to Bordering: The Canary Islands 
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The  arrival  of  more  than  30,000  irregular  immigrants  in  2006  created  an  organizational 
overload in the interception, retention and return provisions. This massive influx conditioned 
the need for organizational innovation so as to improve the coordination among the actors 
involved  in  the  different  stages  of  the  process.  Spain  responded  with  the  creation  of  the 
Canaries Regional Coordination Centre (CRCC) in 2006. The CRCC is headed by a Civil 
Guard General reporting directly to the Directorate General of the Police and Civil Guard. It is 
tasked with integrating, coordinating and centralizing the operations and actions of the State 
and  of  local  administrations  in  terms  of  border  surveillance  and  control,  particularly  that 
pertaining  to  irregular  maritime  immigration.  The  CRCC  hosts  the  joint  operations  with 
FRONTEX in the west African area. 
 
All these changes can be summed up as a shift in border control towards: (a) more coercive 
deterrence through controlling transit and stay after arrival; (b) more repressive deterrence 
through stricter return policies and fewer transfers to the mainland; (c) tighter surveillance of 
maritime areas and stricter identification protocols; and (d) deterrence  through information 
campaigns  about  the  risks  of  irregular  maritime  migration.  The  new  profile  of  maritime 
irregular migration control is characterized by higher detection probabilities at points of origin, 
transit and destination; higher return probabilities; and higher risks for intermediaries of being 
accused of human trafficking and imprisoned (López-Sala & Esteban-Sánchez, 2010: 91). 
 
The sharp reduction in irregular maritime arrivals in the Canary Islands since 2007 is due to 
several  reasons.  First,  the  economic  crisis  drastically  reduced  employment  opportunities  in 
Spain,  with  fewer  arrivals  at  all  parts  of  the  border.  Second,  equalizing  the  relative 
permeability along different parts of the Spanish maritime border lessened the appeal of the 
Canary Islands as a transit area, contributing thereby to a shift back to the Mediterranean route. 
Third, the new political situation in the north of Africa temporarily reduced the efficiency of 
Mediterranean border controls in some origin and transit countries. As a result, Mediterranean 
routes once again dominate maritime irregular migration to Europe. This should be labelled as 
“back to normal”, the extraordinary growth of the Atlantic route being the exception. Under 
conditions of similar permeability levels, the Atlantic route is less attractive: more risky, more 
expensive and lacks the advantages offered by territorial continuity in continents. 
 
The example of the Canary Islands shows how changes in political priorities alter the way 
maritime borders are controlled and how these new practices have to be analysed in the wider 
context of migration policy
13. The expansion of control efforts to other countries, with the 
Spanish (European) police patrolling west African coasts, is an example of how control efforts 
may shift from focusing on maritime areas to controlling lines drawn on the shores of origin 
countries. On the one hand, this shift saves the lives of migrants under risk at sea; on the other 
hand, this control in origin countries may limit the fundamental right of free movement, which 
includes the freedom to leave a country (Carrera, 2007: 25; 2011: 5).  
                                                           
13 “It is striking to see how the fierce struggles that were taking place in the Spanish political arena between the 
government, the then opposition (Partido Popular) and the Canary Islands Government about the context, response 
and implications of the constant inflow of irregular immigrants translated themselves into a ‘call for the EU’ to 
act. FRONTEX was presented as the solution to the constructed spectacle which was qualified as ‘a European 
problem’. The EU was used as the perfect scapegoat for a highly politicised and ‘mediatised’ state of affairs over 
the field of immigration in Spain” (Carrera, 2007: 13). D. Godenau 
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Discussion 
 
The Canary Islands are an example of how permeability is conditioned by border practices and 
not just by natural border attributes. When islands are mentioned as being something special in 
migration analyses, we should be aware of the dangers of exceptionalism (King, 2009: 55-56) 
in  island  studies.  Of  course,  there  are  some  geographical  considerations  to  be  taken  into 
account:  islands  are  only  reachable  by  boat  or  plane;  islands  are  frequently  “outposts”  of 
continental states, so they may be closer for some wishing to enter the country. In any case, 
geographical  considerations  should  not  be  overvalued;  it  is  precisely  the  combination  of 
institutional membership (the island is part of the country the persons wants to enter) and 
geographical  position  (periphery)  that  transforms  some  islands  into  what  López-Sala  & 
Esteban-Sánchez  (2010:78)  call  “interstitial  spaces”  where  migrants  arrive  and  peripheral 
border  control  takes  place.  It  is  not  the  spatial  configuration  in  itself  that  explains  high 
migration intensities on some European islands. The case of the Canary Islands shows how the 
same geographic position may change its strategic value as a part of migration routes over time. 
They became more attractive because of asymmetrical border enforcement; once symmetry is 
re-established,  the  cost-benefit  analysis  of  migrants  and  intermediaries  adjusts  its  relative 
appeal as a node of transit.  
 
Islands, as with other geographical entities, can be used to block transit. This can be done in 
several ways: through detention without transfer and by not admitting undocumented persons 
on transport services which link islands to the continent. In these cases undocumented migrants 
can enter, but they cannot leave again unless they are returned to their country of origin or 
transit. If the quantitative relation between immigration flows and island size implies strong 
impact and visibility, the local population may develop negative reactions towards migrants 
and particularly to their being kept on the island after detention. During the  years of high 
arrival intensity in the Canary Islands, both returns and transfers to the continent were used to 
avoid further accumulation of irregular migrant populations in detention centres. Those who 
were  not  returned  or  taken  to  the  Spanish  mainland  faced  the  problem  of  how  to  use  air 
transport  without  documentation  if  they  wanted  to  leave  the  islands.  Occasionally  local 
governments,  in  order  to  remove  immigrants  from  public  parks  (visibility),  contributed  to 
airlifting irregular migrants to Madrid or Barcelona (note that this is not a transfer from one 
detention centre to another). All in all, the case of the Canary Islands does not support the 
hypothesis of islands being used as a deterrence mechanism through geographic confinement. 
After  2006,  with  rapidly  dropping  arrivals  and  higher  proportions  of  returns,  this  transfer 
policy might have changed gradually towards lower levels of territorial redistribution from the 
border areas to other Spanish regions (López-Sala & Esteban-Sánchez, 2010:91), but in the 
present context in the Canary Islands this does not imply a build-up of pressure in or outside 
the detention centres
14. 
 
 
 
                                                           
14 The situation is different in other Spanish territory, particularly in Ceuta, where low redistribution rates place 
permanent stress on detention capacities. In this sense, Ceuta is a European “island” within Africa where the 
confinement strategy is applied; while in the Canaries a different cost/benefit balance is in place, possibly because 
specialization in international tourism makes them very sensitive to the impact of a “prison for Africans” image.                                                              Institutional Approach to Bordering: The Canary Islands 
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Conclusions 
 
Borders are socially constructed institutions which regulate permeability for flows of people, 
goods and capital. They institutionalize territoriality by establishing rules of entry and exit. 
Borders  are  an  important  determinant  of  international  migration.  Their  analysis  should  go 
beyond  their  representation  as  geographical  lines  or  areas,  and  include  their  institutional 
determination as a key element of migration policies. Islands, be they island states or border 
regions of larger states, comprise an area of research that is of heuristic value when analyzing 
how bordering takes place and evolves during episodes of irregular immigration. 
 
The case of the Canary Islands demonstrates that the effective control of maritime borders is 
feasible if it is politically expedient. Changes in Spanish and EU immigration policies, along 
with a mix of deterrence measures, have progressively reduced the permeability of maritime 
borders, extending border control to the Atlantic. Most important among these have been the 
completion of border surveillance, joint patrols in origin and transit countries, increasing the 
likelihood of repatriation and the imprisonment of boat captains for human smuggling. The 
tendency  toward  de-territorializing  border  enforcement  through  bilateral  agreements,  more 
diplomatic activities in origin countries and information campaigns contributes clearly to the 
objective of sealing maritime borders, but limits the fundamental right of free movement by 
hampering the possibility to leave certain countries. 
 
Although  the  geographic  status  as  European  border  islands  influences  the  probability  of 
receiving irregular maritime migration, the institutional determinants of border permeability 
are more far reaching. The case of the Canary Islands shows how the social construction of 
borders can evolve when political priorities change. The geographic status remains the same, 
but the role these islands play in international migration routes has changed (and may change 
again in the future). 
 
Although all islands receiving unwanted migration could be used to hold and block migrants in 
their transit, in the case of the Canaries this was not the case during the years of massive 
arrivals.  The  deterrence  effects  which  reduced  the  migration  flows  are  not  linked  to  their 
geographic status as islands. At present low frequencies in transfers from the Canaries to the 
Spanish mainland are due to fewer interceptions and free capacity in detention centres and do 
not correspond with the aim of blocking transit migration. 
 
Border management in the EU is heading towards a more intensive use of modern technology 
before, at, and after the border. Southern European border islands will be part of this proactive 
“smart  border”  (Council  of  the  European  Union,  2011:  2).  Satellites,  radars,  sensors  and 
unmanned  aerial  vehicles  will  increasingly  control  maritime  areas,  also  above  and  around 
islands. This technological wall against irregular maritime migration will alter entry modes in 
irregular international migration, particularly if remote control is progressively extended to the 
shores of origin countries. The Canary Islands are illustrative of this generalized trend. 
 
 
 
 D. Godenau 
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